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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**

B5

OCT 22 2010

FILE:

Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

Date:

IN RE:

Petitioner:  
Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Member of the Professions Holding an Advanced Degree or an Alien of Exceptional Ability Pursuant to Section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

**INSTRUCTIONS:**

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion. The fee for a Form I-290B is currently \$585, but will increase to \$630 on November 23, 2010. Any appeal or motion filed on or after November 23, 2010 must be filed with the \$630 fee. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center. The petitioner filed a motion to reopen the director's decision. The director granted the motion and affirmed the decision denying the petition. The petitioner then filed a motion to reopen and motion to reconsider the decision. Again, the director granted the motion and affirmed the decision denying the petition. The petitioner appealed the director's decision. The appeal is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a software consulting and development company. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a software engineer. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL).<sup>1</sup> The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's September 22, 2009 denial, the single issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2), provides for the granting of preference classification to members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent and whose services are sought by an employer in the United States. An advanced

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<sup>1</sup> We note that the case involves the substitution of a beneficiary on the labor certification. Substitution of beneficiaries was permitted by the DOL at the time of filing this petition. The DOL had published an interim final rule, which limited the validity of an approved labor certification to the specific alien named on the labor certification application. See 56 Fed. Reg. 54925, 54930 (October 23, 1991). The interim final rule eliminated the practice of substitution. On December 1, 1994, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, acting under the mandate of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in *Kooritzky v. Reich*, 17 F.3d 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1994), issued an order invalidating the portion of the interim final rule, which eliminated substitution of labor certification beneficiaries. The *Kooritzky* decision effectively led 20 C.F.R. §§ 656.30(c)(1) and (2) to read the same as the regulations had read before November 22, 1991, and allow the substitution of a beneficiary. Following the *Kooritzky* decision, the DOL processed substitution requests pursuant to a May 4, 1995 DOL Field Memorandum, which reinstated procedures in existence prior to the implementation of the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT 90). The DOL delegated responsibility for substituting labor certification beneficiaries to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) based on a Memorandum of Understanding, which was rescinded. See 72 Fed. Reg. 27904 (May 17, 2007) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 656). The DOL's final rule became effective July 16, 2007 and prohibits the substitution of alien beneficiaries on permanent labor certification applications and resulting certifications. As the filing of the instant case predates the rule, substitution will be allowed for the present petition.

degree is a U.S. academic or professional degree or a foreign equivalent degree above the baccalaureate level. The equivalent of an advanced degree is either a U.S. baccalaureate or foreign equivalent degree followed by at least five years of "progressive experience" in the specialty. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on March 28, 2003. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$80,000.00 per year. The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires a bachelor's degree in computer science or an equivalent degree and five years of experience in the job offered or in a related occupation.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>2</sup>

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a C corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 2001, to have a gross annual income of \$2.5 million, net annual income of \$100,000.00, and to currently employ 10 workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year begins on July 1 and ends on June 30. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on June 27, 2007, the beneficiary claims to have worked for the petitioner beginning in April, 2007.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of a Form ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition

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<sup>2</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

later based on the Form ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner has submitted copies of Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, which it issued to the beneficiary for the years 2007 and 2008. These show that the beneficiary was paid [REDACTED] in 2008. As the petitioner paid the beneficiary more than the proffered wage in 2008, it has established its ability to pay the proffered wage for that year. The petitioner must establish its ability to pay the difference between the proffered wage and wages actually paid to the beneficiary in 2007 – [REDACTED]. The petitioner must establish its ability to pay the full proffered wage for the years 2003 through 2006.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, --- F. Supp. 2d. ---, 2010 WL 956001, at \*6 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. *See Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, --- F. Supp. 2d. at \*6 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

*River Street Donuts* at 118. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

For a C corporation, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 28 of the Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its net income for the fiscal years 2002 through 2007, as shown in the table below.

- In FY 2002 (July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2003), the Form 1120 stated net income of [REDACTED]
- In FY 2003 (July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004), the Form 1120 stated net income of [REDACTED]
- In FY 2004 (July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2005), the Form 1120 stated net income of [REDACTED]
- In FY 2005 (July 1, 2005 to June 30, 2006), the Form 1120 stated net income of [REDACTED]
- In FY 2006 (July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007), the Form 1120 stated net income of [REDACTED]
- In FY 2007 (July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2008), the Form 1120 stated net income of [REDACTED]

The petitioner had sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage in 2004, 2005 and 2007. The petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage from the priority date to June 30, 2004, or from July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> As noted above, the priority date in this case is March 28, 2003. Because the petitioner's fiscal year runs from July 1 to June 30 each year, the priority date actually falls in fiscal year 2002.

<sup>4</sup> As noted above, the Form W-2 for 2007 shows that the petitioner paid the beneficiary \$50,680.68 during calendar year 2007. Because the petitioner's fiscal year 2006 ran from July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007, a portion of the beneficiary's 2007 W-2 wages may be attributable to fiscal year 2006. However, the petitioner has failed to establish what portion of the beneficiary's 2007 wages, if any

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>5</sup> A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6 and include cash-on-hand. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its end-of-year net current assets for 2003 and 2006, as shown in the table below.

- In FY 2002 (July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2003), Schedule L stated net current assets of [REDACTED]
- In FY 2003 (July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004), Schedule L stated net current assets of [REDACTED]
- In FY 2006 (July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007), Schedule L stated net current assets of [REDACTED]

The petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage from the priority date to June 30, 2004, or from July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, net income or net current assets.

On appeal, counsel asserts that there is another way to establish the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. With respect to 2003, counsel states that the combination of the petitioner's net income and net current assets exceeds the proffered wage and thus establishes the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. This approach is unacceptable because net income and net current assets are not, in the view of the AAO, cumulative. The AAO views net income and net current assets as two different ways of methods of demonstrating the petitioner's ability to pay the wage--one

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are attributable to fiscal year 2006. A petitioner could establish the amount of wages paid during a non-calendar fiscal year by submitting the Forms W-2 for both relevant calendar years (e.g., 2006 and 2007) and detailed payroll evidence establishing when, exactly, the wages were paid to the beneficiary and in what amounts. Conversely, a petitioner could establish the amount of net income available during a calendar year (when the petitioner uses a non-calendar fiscal year) by submitting audited financial statements establishing the availability of net income to pay the difference between the proffered wage and wages actually paid to the beneficiary in that calendar year, as evidenced by a Form W-2. The petitioner has failed to provide such evidence here. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage in fiscal year 2006.

<sup>5</sup>According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

retrospective and one prospective. Net income is retrospective in nature because it represents the sum of income remaining after all expenses were paid over the course of the previous tax year. Conversely, the net current assets figure is a prospective "snapshot" of the net total of petitioner's assets that will become cash within a relatively short period of time minus those expenses that will come due within that same period of time. Thus, the petitioner is expected to receive roughly one-twelfth of its net current assets during each month of the coming year. Given that net income is retrospective and net current assets are prospective in nature, the AAO does not agree with counsel that the two figures can be combined in a meaningful way to illustrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a single tax year. Moreover, combining the net income and net current assets could double-count certain figures, such as cash on hand and, in the case of a taxpayer who reports taxes pursuant to accrual convention, accounts receivable. Further, it is noted that even if counsel's argument were accepted and the petitioner's net income [REDACTED] and net current assets [REDACTED]<sup>6</sup> for 2003 were combined, the total amount would still be less than the proffered wage and would not establish the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. The same is true for the 2002 fiscal year, ending June 30, 2003.

Counsel also states that the petitioner had [REDACTED] in net current assets in 2006, and thus established its ability to pay the proffered wage. This figure is incorrect, and it is not clear how counsel reached this figure. As stated above, the petitioner's 2006 year-end net current assets were [REDACTED], which is less than the proffered wage.

Counsel's assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL.

In addition, it is noted that USCIS electronic records show that the petitioner filed several other I-140 petitions which have been pending during the time period relevant to the instant petition. If the instant petition were the only petition filed by the petitioner, the petitioner would be required to produce evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage to the single beneficiary of the instant petition. However, where a petitioner has filed multiple petitions for multiple beneficiaries which have been pending simultaneously, the petitioner must produce evidence that its job offers to each beneficiary are realistic, and therefore that it has the ability to pay the proffered wages to each of the beneficiaries of its pending petitions, as of the priority date of each petition and continuing until the beneficiary of each petition obtains lawful permanent residence. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977) (petitioner must establish ability to pay as of the date of the Form MA 7-50B job offer, the predecessor to the Form ETA 750 and Form ETA 9089). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). The record in the instant case contains no information about the proffered wage for the beneficiaries of the other petitions filed by the petitioner, about the current immigration status of the beneficiaries, whether the beneficiaries have withdrawn from the visa petition process, or whether the petitioner has withdrawn its job offers to the beneficiaries. Furthermore, no information is provided about the current employment status of the beneficiaries, the date of any hiring and any current wages of the beneficiaries. Since the record in the instant

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<sup>6</sup> It is further noted that counsel used an incorrect figure of "[REDACTED]" for the petitioner's net current assets in 2003. It is not clear how counsel reached this figure.

petition fails to establish the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage to the single beneficiary of the instant petition, it is not necessary to consider further whether the evidence also establishes the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage to the beneficiaries of the other petitions filed by the petitioner, or to other beneficiaries for whom the petitioner might wish to submit I-140 petitions based on the same approved Form ETA 750 labor certifications.

In addition to the above analysis, USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612. The petitioning entity in *Sonegawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In this matter, no unusual circumstances have been shown to exist in this case to parallel those in *Sonegawa*. The petitioner did not establish a pattern of profitable or successful years, that the period from the priority date to June 30, 2004 or fiscal year 2006 were uncharacteristically unprofitable or difficult for some reason, or that it has a sound business reputation. Further, as noted above, the petitioner has filed multiple Form I-140 petitions. Therefore, considering the totality of the circumstances in the present case, the petitioner has not established that it has the ability to pay the proffered wage.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.